

Under reconstruction! We apologize for the absence of certain materials.

WORLD IN VIEW OF SIPRI

26 March 2003

During a round table on March 26, on issues of export control in Ukraine, Razumkov Centre presented the third Ukrainian edition of the Yearbook SIPRI 2002: armament, disarmament and international security. The materials of this edition are devoted to considerations of events, in point of view of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the USA. These terrorist acts and the reaction towards them marked a watershed in the international security process. Unresolved issues, clashes of interests and conflicts began to be analysed from a different perspective, with new issues and priorities. They have served as a pulse for the reassessment and new definition of the security politics practically by all countries and influential international organisations. These events have sped up the process of the formation of a new global security system.

It would be desirable to attract the attention of the potential readers of the Yearbook, first, to the basic results of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) research, and secondly, to the problems of the transformation of the security system that demand deeper studies and new discussions.

The main results and trends in 2001

Armed conflicts. In 2001, there were 24 major armed conflicts in 22 locations throughout the world. The only interstate conflict that was active in 2001 occurred between India and Pakistan. All of the 15 most deadly conflicts in 2001—those that caused 100 or more deaths during the year—were intra-state conflicts. Most commonly, they threatened to destabilize neighbouring states through the burden of refugees, cross-border movement of rebels (and occasionally national military forces), and the undermining of legitimate economic and political structures through the illicit trade in resources and arms. Eleven of the 15 conflicts have lasted for eight or more years, leading to extensive destruction of economic and social infrastructure. One of the reasons for their endurance is the inability of either side to prevail by force. In the vast majority of the conflicts, rebels used a guerrilla military strategy, but failed to win wide popular support. Governments were unable to use their full strength against small and mobile opponents.

Conflict prevention, management and resolution. The war against terrorism has led to the forging of new relationships between states that were formerly at odds with each other. The global effort against international terrorism marks the appearance of a new paradigm in international politics. It is important that it does not undermine the norms that have so recently been established. There were no new United Nations peace missions in 2001, for the first time since 1996. However, five new multilateral missions were initiated—one of them, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, on the authority of the UN Security Council. There were 51 multilateral peace missions under way in 2001. The shock generated by the attacks and the responses that have followed them carry serious repercussions for the international adoption and practice of conflict prevention. Prevention of terrorism, as currently practised, consists of measures taken to stop international terrorism, cut off the financial, political and military sources of terrorist support and, where possible, apprehend terrorists before they commit acts of terror. The attacks on Afghanistan have inevitably focused attention on the military elements and given vent to the idea of a global military engagement against terrorism.

The military dimension of the European Union. Almost a decade passed after the end of the cold war before the EU developed the concept of a 'second pillar' European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Efforts have been made to meet security risks and challenges in Europe and elsewhere by carrying out the full range of military crisis management tasks. Events in 2001 served as a mid-course test for the success of these efforts.

Democratic control of the security sector. Although security sector reform has become established as part of the international security agenda, there is still not a shared understanding at the international level of what this term means. The response of states to the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001 may slow down the development of a security sector reform agenda—that is, demobilization and demilitarization, spending cuts and the promotion of transparency. Increased importance is being placed on developing cooperation with the armed forces, intelligence services and law enforcement services of other states to identify and eliminate groups and individuals engaged in terrorist acts.

Sanctions applied by the European Union and the United Nations. Sanctions, recognized as a necessary and important instrument for conflict resolution, have not been effective in bringing about a change in the behaviour of their targets when applied as a 'stand-alone' measure. Efforts have been directed to improving sanctions design and implementation as well as considering how they might be used as part of a wider strategy. In the light of experience the United Nations has modified its approach away from the use of comprehensive sanctions towards the use of measures targeted only at those held responsible for wrong or illegal behaviour. The European Union has also elaborated its approach to the use of sanctions as part of its common foreign and security policy. In addition to giving effective expression to decisions of the United Nations, the EU has also developed a distinctive approach to the use of sanctions in foreign policy areas where the UN has not provided direction, notably to support the parts of the CFSP aimed at improving human rights.

Military expenditure. World military expenditure in 2001 is estimated at \$839 billion in current prices, an increase of 2 per cent in real terms over 2000. This corresponds to an average of 2.6 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP) and \$137 per capita. The post-cold war decline in military expenditure lasted 11 years (1988-98). Since 1998 world military expenditure has been increasing again. The combined increase in world military expenditure since 1998 is 7 per cent in real terms. More than half of the world total is spent by five high-income countries in the West: in 2001 the USA accounted for 36 per cent of the world total, followed by Japan with 6 per cent and France, Russia and the UK, with 4 per cent each. Most of the countries with the heaviest economic burden in terms of military expenditure as a share of GDP are located in the Middle East, where official military expenditure accounts for more than 5 per cent in several countries. Countries involved in armed conflict in Africa also have a high defence burden, even according to their official figures, although these are likely to understate actual expenditure by a significant amount.

Arms production. The restructuring of arms production that has taken place during the post cold war period has resulted in an increased level of concentration, in particular among the major arms-producing companies in the USA. In Europe, efforts continue to achieve increased concentration into larger companies on the European level. During 2001 several new European joint ventures were created for this purpose. While internationalization at the transatlantic level has been subject to even more political challenges than within Europe, the participation of the UK and British companies in the US-led JSF programme marked an important step in transatlantic military industrial relations. The approval in June 2001 by the French and US governments of a major joint venture may also serve as a test case for future transatlantic military industrial links. The Russian arms industry is still characterized by an extreme degree of over capacity and dependence on arms exports.

Arms transfers. In 2001 the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons and military technology for foreign licensed production of such weapons was \$16.2 billion, in constant 1990 prices, slightly higher than in 2000. Calculated as a five-year moving average, however, the level continued to decline in 2001 (the total volume in 1997-2001 was \$100.7 billion). The USA, accounting for 44.5 per cent of global arms transfers, remained the largest supplier in the period 1997-2001 despite a 65 per cent reduction in its arms deliveries since 1998. Russia was the second largest supplier in the period 1997-2001, accounting for 17 per cent of total arms transfers. As the result of a 24 per cent increase in arms transfers between 2000 and 2001 it became the largest supplier in 2001, with 30.7 per cent of the total. The five major recipients in the period 1997-2001 were China, India, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Turkey. China was by far the largest recipient in 2001, with 19 per cent of the total, after an increase of 44 per cent from 2000. Imports by India increased by 50 per cent, making it the third largest recipient in 2001 after the UK.

Arms control after 11 September. While restoring the traditional linkage between arms control and military security, the Bush Administration underlined that agreements and arrangements need to be adapted to the contemporary strategic environment. This is not an abandonment of arms control. However, at present arms control can be seen as primarily a framework in which structured dialogue can be organized around armaments policy.

Nuclear arms control and missile defence. On 13 December President Bush gave formal notice that the USA would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. There was disagreement between the USA and Russia over the form and substance of the reductions in their countries' strategic nuclear force levels. Specifically, there was a dispute over whether they would be made within the framework of a 'traditional' arms control treaty or as parallel, non-legally binding instruments. There was also a disagreement over whether the nuclear warheads scheduled to be removed from delivery vehicles should be dismantled, as insisted upon by Russia, or could be placed in storage, as advocated by the USA.

The military uses of outer space. At the end of 2001 the USA, as the only superpower, had nearly 110 operational military spacecraft—well over two-thirds of all the military spacecraft orbiting the earth. Russia was a distant second, with about 40, and the rest of the world had only about 20 satellites in orbit. The issue of the military uses of space has resurfaced on the arms control agenda. China, France and Russia, supported by Canada, Sri Lanka and other states, have called for the negotiation of a new multilateral treaty to prohibit the deployment of weapons in space.

Conventional arms control. In 2001 the international community focused its attention on regional and domestic sources of conflict and relevant arms control measures, particularly those of an operational character. In Europe the focus was on the implementation of agreed measures and the search for new approaches to the politico-military dialogue. The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty) is being implemented, but Russia's non-compliance has hindered its entry into force. A second review conference was held in 2001. Russia has made insufficient progress towards complying with its obligations with regard to agreed flank levels, although it has met its commitments regarding troop withdrawals from Moldova. In Georgia the future of one Russian military base and the continued presence of Russian forces remain to be resolved. The Balkan arms control regimes worked well, and the agreement on regional stabilization 'in and around Yugoslavia' was successfully concluded. Regional and bilateral confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) continued to work smoothly, and new bilateral CSBMs were introduced in Europe. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) military doctrine seminar evaluated new threats and challenges and identified possible additional directions for the work of the OSCE in the zone of application. After years of deadlock the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies entered into force on 1 January 2002, after Russia and Belarus ratified it in 2001.

Multilateral export control. After the terrorist attacks on the USA, certain decisions that were difficult to take in the framework of the export control regime may have become

Multilateral export control. After the terrorist attacks on the USA, certain decisions that were difficult to take in the framework of the export control regimes may have become possible because of a heightened awareness of the need to reduce the risk that entities planning terrorist acts will acquire non-conventional weapons. Particular attention is being paid to the following questions: the development of procedures for sharing information related to licensing and enforcement; the development of a more harmonized approach to risk assessment and the identification of programmes of concern; the development of common approaches to end-user controls in countries where programmes of concern are located; and to the question of how to apply controls to new types of commercial practices in a changing market.

SOME PRESENT PROBLEMS

The complexity of the search by mankind for a new paradigm of being is in concentrating attention on separate problems, as important as they may be, that do not allow to go beyond the framework of existing rules, norms and habits. But any one problem can be solved "from within" itself. It is necessary to find and to feel interrelations between all spheres of security and connections between actions and results, to reveal and to estimate the tendencies of the development of the world situation, to compare the common knowledge framework with the modern situation.

The creation of effective systems, of both global and regional security, is a significant problem of the present, particularly in view of many aspects of the tendencies of world globalisation. The terrorism acts in the USA demonstrated that the norms, procedures, mechanisms and institutes of the existing security system are not ready to effectively counteract this threat. The terrorists' actions are more systematic. Their co-ordination covers all stages of general cycle from motivation, to preparation and realisation. At the same time, the reactions against terrorist network activity cannot brag about such systemic attributes when the prevention of terrorism acts and conflicts, forces and means, are dispersed between many international organisations, between separate countries, when they are poorly co-ordinated, and their improvement depends on inconsistent political and economic restrictions, and they are under the pressure of bureaucratic procedures.

In this sense, there are both negative and positive aspects in the propensity of the USA for unilateral actions, in their attempts "to draw" on itself the central role in the fight against terrorism. On the one hand, the attempts to fix the bipolar model of the world, that was established after the end of the cold war, have to be put on guard. The unilateral actions (even with the collaboration of the coalition) strengthen not only the political, but also the economic positions of the USA in problem regions, while moving problems from the military and political spheres into the sphere of economic relations, into a level of international economic competition. In many cases the latent problems lay exactly in the economic sphere. In compliance with dialectic laws, such a situation creates opposition from the other pole (or poles), which is not always constructive. It breaks the balance of the international system and results in antagonism not only from the opponents, but also from the rest of the world, and even from the allies (for example, contradiction between USA and France and Germany on Iraq issues). Such a model does not strengthen stability, but contributes to its weakening. The USA is, first of all, interested in the preservation of the existing situation, especially from the point of view of strengthening their presence in the problem regions.

On the other hand, any international organisation, including the UN (and a separate country all the more), don't have the capabilities to do full-scale activity on the maintenance of global security (in all its aspects), to lead this struggle, to co-ordinate the activities of the many organisations and countries without the participation of the USA. The concentration these functions by the USA, as the leader in the security sphere, gives these functions efficiency, resource support, and the most effective application of military abilities. Moreover, ideally, research on the various aspects of such model functioning can promote the formulation of the requirements and directions of the greater improvement of the UN, regional centres, and the security system on the whole.

Another problem is concerned with answers to the questions: against what is the struggle directed? what is more acceptable and effective: struggle against the reasons, which stipulate for negative occurrences, or the counteraction to self negative occurrences and their consequences? The results of the study of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict prove that the international community has spent around \$200 billion on seven major military interventions in 90 years, however the preventive actions in each case would have saved the international community almost \$130 billion. Actually, it is necessary to note a significant increase of international organisations', and countries' interests in conflict and terrorism prevention.

It is impossible to agree completely with some experts' conclusions that are reduced to three main statements: first, terrorism is not a war against globalisation; second, the terrorists' actions were not a form of a fight of the poor against the rich; and consequently, third, in searching for an adequate answer to this new threat, it is important to avoid the decisions, which are based on the belief that the root of the threats are concrete internal conditions or fundamental problems, such as the standard of living, or the unfair gap between the rich and the poor. Certainly, it is not true that all paupers support terrorism. But not all the rich are in delight from modern methods of struggle against this threat. It is necessary to realise that the global stratification in standards of welfare is a fostering environment for the occurrence of contradictions, and updating the number of indignant individuals, from which the terrorist elements are recruited and are brought up. The flagrant contrasts in development and incomes between a small number of countries with a high level of living standards and the rest of the world are important in understanding the root of conflicts. If this problem is not solved, it will be impossible to seriously expect a success in the opposition of challenges to global security.

The answer to the question about the methods and directions of the counteraction against the threats is not simple. First, as always, the question about the maintenance of the security measures with resources (human, financial, material, information, legal) arises. Therefore, the breadth and depth of the complex of measures, as a rule, cover only part of the complete cycle of the activity of negative factors (origin, occurrence, escalation, impact, consequences), for which existing resources are enough. Secondly, it is impossible to always counteract threats in their early stages because each of them has a temporary line and structural features: one threat may be in the origin stage of contradictions; the root of another threat has a century of history; the basis of one threat is in economic divergences between the interests of parties, and other threats are based on a complex of ethnic, economic and political contradictions, and revealing these contradictions in the early stages is very difficult (though it is possible); practically all actors of international activity are interested in the counteraction against one threat (for example, terrorism), however the struggle against another threat (for example, atmospheric industrial emissions), negatively influences the interests of other actors. Therefore, approaches to security problems should be first, systemic, secondly, concrete and, third, based on the responsibility of nations.

In regards to the adaptation of the security system to new challenges, it is necessary to determine the directions of their reforms, the principles and general rules. It concerns both collective and national security systems. There are many problems in this sphere. One of them is a parity between functional expediency in the security sphere and orientation in democratic transformations. In contrast to the activity of the community democratisation area, measures that are caused by functional expediency (for example, creating power structures, improvement of their activity, etc.) have, as a rule, a short time for their realisation and come to an end with appreciable results. If these measures are accompanied by an appropriate increase of the role of social democratic institutes, then the democratic control of power structures (and of the state on the whole) - is beyond the question. But if the state does not adhere to this rule, if the authorities are only worried about the preservation of their positions, and for the sake of these aims, they strengthen the machinery of compulsion, justifying these actions as being directed at functional expediency - society could be faced with great difficulties. Under these conditions, the machinery of compulsion becomes self-sufficient, transforming into a "state within a state", receiving levers of decisive influence on the situation within a country, while keeping its own interests at the fore-front. Certainly, there is no sense to speak about democracy in such conditions. It is very dangerous when society begins to perceive justifications for actions directed at the suppression of political opposition, which are carried out under a mask of expediency of struggle with terrorism.

Summary

It is not necessary to have a rich imagination in order to see that the majority of the mentioned problems concern Ukraine to some extent. Domestic and foreign experts have many questions concerning the effectiveness of the export control system, and probable consequences of the acceptance of the law on antiterrorist activity in Ukraine that in fact confer emergency authority to some power structures. And the issue is not in the poor quality of the mentioned system or law - they are sustained in Western standards and, basically, achieve the necessary results. But the submission of all power vertical to the uniform centre (the President), together with real or artificial occasions to mistrust the moral qualities and organisational solvency of this centre, in aggregation with the absence of effective mechanisms of civil control of power structures and authority on the whole, will always cause suspicion in an opportunity for the infringement of citizens' democratic norms, rights and freedom, and in default by Ukraine in its international obligations.

The Ukrainian authority's account of the analysis of the events carried out by SIPRI experts, the revealed trends and conclusions in which the attempts are made to find out the adequate answers to modern challenges, could give a significant increase of quality of the state decisions in the field of international politics, in re-structuring of the economy, particularly, the defence industry, in spheres of peacekeeping activity, export control and security on the whole. The possession of such information is not excessive for the NGOs too, if they want to do relevant estimates of the international situation and if they try to structurally influence the formation of the state policy. Therefore, it gives up hope that the periodic edition in Ukraine of a SIPRI Yearbook will play a positive role in the formation of an effective state policy and public thought.

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